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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERRY HARRIS, I 
Plaintiff and I 
Respondent, 
I 
vs. Case No. 15797 
I 
BALLARD L. HARRIS, 
I 
Defendant and 
Appellant. I 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of tJJe 
District Court of Box Elder County, Utah, 
Honorable VeNoy Christofferson, Judge 
I. GORDON HUGGINS, ESQ. 
First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Respondent 
PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ. 
Legal Forum Buildinq 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERRY HARRIS I I 
I 
I 
/' 
I 
I 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 15797 
BALLARD L. HARRIS, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for modification of a Decree of Divorce 
brought by the Plaintiff and Respondent, Sherry Harris, against 
the Defendant and Appellant, Ballard L. Harris. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon an evidentiary hearing held before the Honorable 
VeNoy Christofferson, Judge of the First District Court, the 
Court found a sufficient change in circumstances to increase 
the child support to the sum of $75.00 per month per child 
for the parties' three children. (R-39) The Trial Court ordered 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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that the child support for the three minor children shall be 
until said children attain the age of 21 years or until they 
otherwise become self-supporting. (R-40) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks to reverse the Order of the Lower 
Court, and the specific ruling that children attain the age 
of majority in divorce proceedings upon attaining the age of 
21 years or otherwise become self-supporting. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were divorced on the 20th day of June, 1970, 
upon a hearing before the Honorable VeNoy Christofferson, wherein 
the Defendant and Appellant was ordered to pay child support 
in the sum of $60.00 per month as and for child support on 
the three minor children of the parties, and that such payment 
would be ordered until said 0 children reached their majority 
or until the further order of the Court. 
That the issue born of the marriage are Angela, who, 
is 18, Troy, who is 16, and Chris, who is 12 years of age at 
the time the modification hearing was held on February 6, 1978. 
(R-51 
The Respondent in the Lower Court at the evidentiary 
-2-
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hearing was permitted to testify as to the expenses of the 
parties' 18-year old daughter incident to said daughter's college 
expenses. (R-5) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THE AGE OF MAJORITY IN 
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS rs 21 YEARS OF AGE. 
The Lower Court specifically held that the age of majority 
in divorce cases is 21 years of age pursuant to statute. (R-
~ - 101 
That Utah Code Annotated, 15-2-1, concerns the period 
of minority as follows: 
The period of minority extends in males and 
females to the age 18 years; but all minors 
obtain their majority by marriage. It is 
further provided that courts in divorce actions 
may order support to age 21. (As amended 1975) 
Prior to the legislature enactment in 1975, the former 
statute provided that the age of majority extended in the males 
to the age of 21 and in females to the age of 18, but that 
all minors obtained their majority through marriage. 
The Court previously held in Stanton v. Stanton, 564 
P.2d 303 (1977), as follows: 
The Amendment to Section 15-2-1 has served to 
further clarify the status of Utah law and 
establishes as a matter of public policy the age 
of majority for both sexes at age 18. 
-3-
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The Washington Court in Childers v. Childers, 552 P.2d 
83 (19761, was presented with an issue very analogous to the 
instant matter, wherein the Defendant appealed from an order 
requiring him to pay support for his son until such time as 
the son ceased being enrolled in a university or other form 
of higher education and ceased to be otherwise dependent upon 
the parties for support. 
The Washington Court in Childers v. Childers, cited 
supra, held that a parent owes a duty of support to his children 
only during their minority with the exception that a parent 
may have a continuing duty to care for a defective adult child. 
The Washington Court in examining the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution set forth the basis for determining 
whether a denial of equal protection exists in holding: 
When a statute establishes a class to receive 
different treatment, these constitutional provi-
sions require that: 
"classifications must meet and satisfy two 
requirements: (1) The legislation must apply 
alike to all persons within a designated class; 
and (2) reasonable ground must exist for making 
a distinction between those who fall within a 
class and those who do not." 
The Washington Court determined that the first criteria 
was met, in that the statute applied equally to children of 
divorced parents. However, the Court held that the second 
criteria was not met, and stated that: 
-4-
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There is no reasonable ground to make a distinc-
tion between adult children of divorced parents 
and adult children of married parents. Of course 
there is good reason for the State to take partic~lar 
interest in minor children of divorce parents.*** 
But the distinction vanishes when the child 
becomes 18. There is no logical reason to 
require divorce parents to support their 
children for an indefinite period into their 
majority while married parents are free to 
bid their children a fiscal farewell at age 
18. 
The issue considered by the Washington Court is analogous 
to the instant matter under U.C.A., 15-2-1, except the Utah 
Statute does not apply alike to all children of divorced parents. 
That the Trial Court is vested with legislative authority to 
order support in divorce cases for the,children to age 21, 
but is not required to order support to age 21 for majority 
attained at age 18. 
The Washington Court in Childers v. Childers, cited 
supra, further held that the father's liability under a Decree 
of Support ceases when the child reaches his majority and that 
such is true where the Decree recites that such order of support 
continues "until the further Order of this Court", for the 
reason that such child upon attaining the age of majority is 
no longer a ward of the Court and there is no duty to support 
adult children. 
That the Kansas Supreme Court in Rice v. Rice, 518 P.2d 
477 (1974), held that a child's father is not required to make 
-5-
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child support payments beyond the child's minority unless an 
intent to the contrary is clearly expressed and that the child's 
support obligation terminates at the age of 18 years, even 
though the Decree was entered prior to the effective date of 
the Kansas Statute setting forth 18 years of age as the age 
of majority. 
The Kansas Supreme Court further held in Rice v. Rice, 
cited supra, that a child has no vested right in future child 
support in a Decree of Divorce which provides that the child's 
father is to make child support payments until the child reaches 
the age of majority for the duty or obligation imposed is terminatec 
as of the effective date of the statute amending the age of 
majority from 21 years to 18 years of age. 
The New Mexico Court similarly in Mason v. Mason, 507 
P.2d 781 (1973), held that minority is a legal status conditioned 
primarily upon age, and that it was the father's duty to support 
his children only during their minority, unless married or 
emancipated prior to the age at which said children reach their 
age of majority. 
Further, the New Mexico Court held that the father's 
liability was to the age of 18, although the age of majority 
was 21 years at the time the Decree was entered where the Divorce 
Decree provided that the father's liability to pay support 
~or the children would be until the children reached their 
-6-
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respective age of majority. 
It appears clear that the Court misapplied u.c.A., 15-
2-1, as amended 1975, which clearly sets 18 years of age as 
the age of majority in stating: 
For clarification of a new statute as to when 
majority is reached, that shall be 21 or until 
they otherwise become self-supporting. Self-
supporting shall be defined as the minimum 
wage as set by the government. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the age of majority 
being a legal status rather than a vested right and the Utah 
Legislature having set the age of majority as 18 years of age, 
requiring a divorced parent to provide child support beyond 
the age of majority when a father who is not divorced is not 
required to support his child after said child reaches the 
age of majority violates the Appellant's constitutional right 
to equal protection under the law pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
POINT II 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS POWER IN EXTENDING 
THE AGE OF SUPPORT TO THE APPELLANT'S MINOR DAUGHTER. 
That at the time the Decree of Divorce was awarded on 
or about June 16, 1970, u.c.A., 15-2-1, provided that: 
The period of minority extends in males to the age 
of 21 years and in females to that of 18 yea:s; 
but all minors obtain their majority by marriage. 
-7-
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That the Supreme Court of Utah in Harmon v. Harmon, 
491 P.2d 231 (19711, held by referring to u.c.A., 30-3-5: 
In the language of the statute, and as stated 
numerous times by the decisions of this Court, 
these propositions are firmly established: (1) 
That such proceedings are equitable; and (2) that 
under the authority conferred "to make subsequent 
changes or new orders with respect to *** the 
custody of the children and their support and 
maintenance***", the Court retains jurisdiction 
to deal with such matters in supplemental pro-
ceedings with the same authority and in the same 
manner as it could deal with them originally. 
That the Utah Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Mitchell, 
527 P.2d 1359 (1974), it was reiterated that the Trial Court 
has the power to make such subsequent changes in respect to 
support and maintenance as such Trial Court could have dealt 
with originally. 
Therefore, the Trial Court in entering a Decree of Divorce 
in June, 1970, was limited to ordering child support as to 
females to the age of 18 years, and by ordering the Appellant 
to provide child support until Appellant's 18-year old daughter 
reaches the age of 21 years upon the Respondent's request for 
modification, the Trial Court has entered an order that said 
Trial Court was prohibited from ordering at the time the Decree 
of Divorce was granted to Respondent and is clearly beyond the 
authority conferred upon the Lower Court. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT 21 IS THE AGE 
OF MAJORITY IN DIVORCE CASES COULD BE THE BASIS 
UPON WHICH THE COURT ENTERED ITS MODIFICATION ORDER. 
Lt is clear from the Court pronouncement, that the age 
of 21 or until the child becomes self-supporting shall be the 
age of majority. (R-40) is contrary to U.C.A., 15-2-1, which 
specifically provides that the age of minority extends only 
to the age of 18 years and not to the age of 21 years. 
Therefore, it appears that the Lower Court Order requiring 
the Appellant to provide child support to the age of 21 years 
or until the children become self-supporting based upon the 
Court's determination that the period of minority is 21 years 
in matters of divorce being an erroneous application of U.C.A., 
15-2-1, it is necessary that the instant matter be remanded 
for proper consideration of u.C.A., 15-2-1. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted to this Honorable Court, 
that the imposition and requiring of child support to the age 
of 21 years is in denial of the Appellant's right to equal 
protection under the law, in that the father who has not become 
divorced from his spouse has no obligation to provide support 
to the child and can give such child a fiscal farewell upon 
such child attaining the age of majority. 
-9-
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It is further submitted, that the age of majority in 
the State of Utah by virtue of U.C.A., 15-2-1 and the Court's 
Decision in the 1977 Stanton case is 18 years of age. 
It is further submitted that the Lower Court exceeded 
its power of modifying the Decree of Divorce entered prior 
to the legislative change of u.c.A., 15-2-1 in 1975, in that 
the Lower Court could not have ordered the Defendant to provide 
child support for the parties' daughter, Angela, now at the 
age of 18 years. 
Respectfully submitted 
Attorney for Appellant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
1978. 
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A copy of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant 
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the Attorney for the Respondent, I. Gordon Huggins, First Security 
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